

A
LETTER
ABOUT

Liberty and Necessity:

Written to the
DUKE of NEWCASTLE,
By THOMAS HOBBS of
Malmesbury:

With OBSERVATIONS
upon it,

By a Learned Prelate of the
Church of England lately de-
ceased.

LONDON,

Printed by J. Grover, for W. Crooke, at the
Green Dragon without Temple-Bar. 1676.

Imprimatur,

*Anton. Saunders, ex Re-
verendissimo Archi-
episc. Cant. à Sacris
Dontesticis.*

Ex Aedibus Lam-
bethanis, Jan. 19.

1675.
6.





Mr. HOBBS *his Opinion*
about Liberty and Necessity,
sent in a Letter to the DUKE
of NEWCASTLE.

First, I conceive, that when
 it cometh into a man's
 mind to do, or not to do, some
 certain Action, if he have no
 time to deliberate the doing of
 it or abstaining, necessarily
 followeth the present Thought
 he had of the good or evil
 Consequence thereof to him-
 self. As, for Example, in sud-
 den Anger, the Action should

follow the Desire of Revenge; in sudden Fear, the Thought of Escape. Also when a man had time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never any thing appeared that should make him doubt of the Consequence, the Action follows his opinion of the Goodness or Harm of it: these Actions I call Voluntary; my *Lord* (if I understand him right) calleth them Spontaneous. I call them Voluntary, because those actions which follow immediately the last Appetite are voluntary; and here where is one onely Appetite, that one is the last. Besides, I see it's reasonable to punish a rash Action, which could not be justly done by
man

man to man, unless the same were voluntary. For no Action of man can be said to be without Deliberation, though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of Action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of Anger, shall nevertheless be justly put to death, because all the time wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual Deliberation, and consequently the Killing shall proceed from Election.

Secondly, I conceive, when

a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he doth nothing else but consider whether it be better for him to do it or not to do it; and to consider an Action is to imagine the Consequences of it both good and evil. From whence it is to be inferred, That Deliberation is nothing else but alternate Hope and Fear, or alternate Appetite, to do or quit the Action of which he deliberateth.

Thirdly, I conceive, that in all Deliberations, that is to say, in all alternate succession of contrary Appetites, the last is that which we call the Will, and is immediately before the doing of the Action, or next
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before the doing of it become impossible. All other Appetites to do and to quit, that come upon a man during his Deliberations, are usually called Intentions, and Inclinations, but not Will, there being but one Will, which also in this case may be called the Last Will, though the Intention change often.

Fourthly, that those Actions which a man is said to do upon Deliberation, are said to be voluntary, and done upon Choice and Election: so that voluntary Action, and Action proceeding from Election, is the same thing: and that of voluntary Agents, 'tis all one to say, he is free, and to say, he

hath made an end of deliberating.

Fifthly, I conceive Liberty to be rightly defined in this manner. "Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to Action, that are not contained in the natural and intrinsic quality of the Agent. As, for Example, the Water is to be seen descend freely, or to have liberty to ascend up the channel of the River, because there is no impediment; and though the Water cannot ascend, yet men say it never wants the liberty to ascend, but the power or faculty, because the impediment is in the nature of the Water, and intrinsic. So also we say,

say, He that is tyed, wants liberty to go, because that the impediment is not in him, but in his Bonds; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself.

Sixthly, I conceive, that nothing taketh beginning from it self, but from the action of some other immediate Agent without it self; and that therefore when first a man hath an Appetite or Will to something, to which immediately before he had no Appetite nor Will, the cause of his Will is not the Will it self, but something else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy, of voluntary Actions,

the Will is a necessary cause, and by this which is said the Will is also caused by other things which it disposeth not ; it followeth, that voluntary Actions have all their necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.

Seventhly, I hold That to be a sufficient Cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the Effect: the same also is a necessary Cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient Cause shall not bring forth the Effect, then there wanteth somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the Cause was not sufficient: but if it be impossible that a sufficient Cause should

should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause. For it is said to produce an effect necessarily, that cannot but produce it. Hence is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, else it had not been. And therefore also Voluntary Actions are necessitated.

Lastly, I hold that the ordinary definition of a Free Agent, namely, That a Free Agent is that which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it, implies a contradiction, and is Nonsense; being as much as to say, the Cause may be sufficient

cient, that is, necessary, and yet the Effect not follow. My Reasons

For the first 5 points, where it is explicated. 1. What Spontaneity is. 2. What Deliberation is. 3. What Will, Propension, and Appetite, is. 4. What a Free Agent is. 5. What Liberty is. There can be no other proof offered, but every mans own Experience by reflection on himself, and remembring what he useth to have in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth when he saith, an Action is Spontaneous, a man Deliberates, such is his Will, that Agent or Action is Free. Now he that so reflecteth upon himself, cannot
but

but be satisfied that Deliberation is the considering of the good and evil Sequels of the Action to come: that by Spontaneity is meant Inconsiderate Proceedings, or else nothing is meant by it: that Will is the last act of our Deliberation: that a Free Agent is he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will: and that Liberty is the Absence of External Impediments. But to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive, but what they hear; and are not able, or will not take the pains to consider what they think, when they hear such words, no argument can be sufficient, because Experience and Matter of Fact is not
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verified by other mens Arguments, but by every mans own Sense and Memory. For example, how can it be proved that to love a thing, and to think it good, is all one, to a man that does not mark his own meaning by those words? Or how can it be proved that Eternity is not *Nunc stans* to a man that says these words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive it himself in his mind? Also the 6th. point, that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a Cause, can no other way be made known, but by crying how he can imagine it; but if he try, he shall find as much reason (if there be no Cause

Cause of the thing) to conceive it should begin at one time as an other ; that is, he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible ; and therefore he must think there was some special Cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later, or else that it began never, but was Eternal.

For the 7th. point, that all Events have necessary Causes, it is there proved in that they have sufficient Causes. Further, let us also in this place suppose any Event never so casual, as the throwing (for example) *Ambis-ace* upon a Pair of Dice, and see if it must not have been necessary before it
was

was thrown ; for seeing it was thrown, it had a beginning, and consequently a sufficient Cause to produce it, consisting partly in the Dice, partly in outward things, as the posture of the parts of the Hand, the measure of Force applied by the Caster, the posture of the parts of the Table, and the like. In summe, there was nothing wanting which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular Cast, and consequently that Cast was necessarily thrown ; for if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the Cause had not been sufficient. In the like manner it may be pro-

proved, that every other Accident, how contingent soever it be, is produced necessarily ; which is that that my L. Bishop disputes against. The same also may be proved in this manner : Let the case be put (for example) of the Weather ; 'tis necessary that to morrow it shall rain, or not rain ; if therefore it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain ; otherwise there is no necessity that the Proposition [It shall rain or not rain] should be true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true, that one of the two shall come to pass, but not singly that it shall rain ; which is as much as to say,
one

one of them is necessary , yet neither of them is necessary ; and to seem to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, that neither of them is true *determinatè*, but *indeterminatè*: which distinction either signifies no more but this , *One of them is true but we know not which* , and so the Necessity remains though we know it not; or if the meaning of the distinction be not that, it hath no meaning , and they might as well have said, *One of them is true Tytiricè*, but neither of them *Tupatulicè*.

The last thing, in which also consisteth the whole controversy , namely, that there is no such thing as an Agent ,
which

which when all things necessary to Action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it, or (which is all one) that there is no such thing as Freedom from Necessity, is easily inferred from that which hath been before alledged; for if it be an Agent, it can work, and if it work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the Action, and consequently the Cause of the Action is sufficient, and if sufficient, then also necessary, as hath been proved before.

And thus you see how the inconveniences, which his Lordship (Bishop Bramhal) objecteth, must follow upon the holding of Necessity, are avoided.

voided, and the Necessity it self demonstratively proved. To which I could adde, if I thought it good Logick, the inconvenience of denying Necessity; as that it destroyeth both the Decrees and the Pre-science of God Almighty: for whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by Man as an Instrument, or foreseeth shall come to pass, a man, if he have Liberty, (such as his Lordship affirmeth) from Necessitation, might frustrate, and make not to come to pass; and God should either not foreknow it, and not decree it, or he should foreknow such things should be as shall never be, and decree that which shall.

shall never come to pass.

This is all that hath come into my mind touching this question since I last considered it, and I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate it onely to my Lord Bishop: and so praying God to prosper Your Lordship in all Your Designs, I take leave, and am (my most Noble and most Obliging Lord)

Your most Humble Servant,

Rouen, Aug. 20.

1645.

THO. HOBBS.

The POSTSCRIPT.

Arguments seldom work on men of Wit and Learning, when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary Opinion; if any thing do it, it is the shewing them the Cause of their Error, which is this. Pious men attribute to God Almighty, for Honours sake, whatsoever they see is Honourable in the world, as Seeing, Hearing, Willing, Knowing, Justice, Wisdom, &c. but deny him such poor things as Eyes, Ears, Brains, and other Organs, without which we Worms neither have nor can conceive such Faculties to be, and so far they do well. But when they

they dispute of Gods Actions Philosophically, then they consider them again as if he had such Faculties, and in that manner as we have them, this is not well; and thence it is they fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God's Nature, he is no fit subject for our Philosophy. True Religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's Lieutenants, and in giving God such Honour both in Attributes and Actions, as they in their several Lientenancies shall ordain.

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[illegible]



OBSERVATIONS

Upon A

LETTER

Of

Mr. T. Hobbs to the Duke of
NEWCASTLE,

*Which he calls His Opinion
about Liberty and Necessity.*

THE Design of the Letter, or (as he himself speaks in one part of it) that in which the whole Contro-
B versie

versie consists, is, That Voluntary Agents do always act necessarily, or (which is all one) act without liberty, that is, from necessity. And this Opinion of his is first set down in 8 Points, and then (as the Title of the next Part imports) so many Reasons to those Points. The first Point is, That by *Spontaneity* is meant *Inconsiderate Proceeding, &c. without Deliberation.*

I call this the first Point, not because I find Spontaneity described here, but because at the entrance of his Reasons he declares that to be his design. It's true that he saith somewhat of the Bishops Opinion concerning it, but very doubtfully,

fully, as he had cause; for he shall not find among any that maintain the difference between Spontaneous and Voluntary Actions, that Spontaneity consists in Inconsiderateness or Indeliberation, as he would have it, when he says it must mean that or nothing. Whereas indeed his Adversaries would be as well content it should mean nothing as that. For Inconsideration is the privation and want of considering where it should and ought to have been, (*i. e.*) in Agents of Reason and Will; for we do not say that Natural Agents, that have no Reason and Will, do act inconsiderately. For when the Water

doth *sponte fluere*, and the Fire *calefacere*, we cannot say they do it inconsiderately, or for want of that Deliberation, of which they are not capable; for you might as well say, they act so for want of Reason: and if want of Reason and Deliberation makes an Action spontaneous, then all violent Actions would be spontaneous, for they also want Reason in all natural Agents, as that the Water ascends for want of Reason and Deliberation.

And therefore the next time Mr. *Hobbs* means to play the Philosopher about Necessity and Liberty, I shall advise him to take better notice of the nature and difference between
Spon-

Spontaneous and Voluntary Actions. Men call those Voluntary Actions, as the word it self imports, that proceed from the Will, (*i.e.*) voluntary Agents; and those Spontaneous, that proceed from the fixt unchangeable nature of (*i.e.*) from natural Agents. If Mr. *Hobbs* knew not this difference, let him learn't against another time; if he did know it, it had been the part of a good Philosopher to have took notice of it, and when he would prove that Spontaneous and Voluntary are all one, to make instance in such Actions as are in that more appropriate and special sence called Spontaneous; such as I nam'd before,

the Water's flowing, and the Fire's heating, and make it appear that they are also Voluntary, that is, do follow the last Will of the Water and Fire, (for so, Voluntary, is defined.) Now if no man in his right wits will either say that these are Voluntary, or gainsay their being Spontaneous, (*i.e.*) that they do *sponte agere*; it must of necessity follow, first, That there is a manifest difference between those sorts of Actions; and secondly, That it is necessary that those things which differ, for more distinct knowledge, should have given them also different Appellations; and thirdly, That none are of themselves more apt, though

though they may sometimes be used promiscuously, than those of Voluntary and Spontaneous.

But for so much as I have already taken notice of in the first Point, whether he be mistaken in the Bishop, or I in him, it makes not much either for or against the principal question of Liberty; for I find no mention of Spontaneity afterwards, that there need any enquiry of the nature and definition of it.

But for voluntary Actions, because we have often use of them in the following Discourse, it will be better worth the labour to examine what they are defined to be.

Those Actions that follow immediately the last Appetite are Voluntary.

I should acknowledge this Definition, if the word [last] did not corrupt it, which makes it either false or frivolous. For if he supposes it to be the last Will before it be followed, it is false, for it becomes rather the Last by being followed; or if that Will be supposed to be followed because it is last, it is also false; for the Action follows the Will because it is the Will, not because it is the last Will: for the Will is last because it is followed, not followed because it is last. It's not First or Last that makes a thing willed, but because

cause it is good, or seems so.
 Or if there be a sence in which
 it is not false, it is yet frivolous.
 As if a man should say out of a
 deep contemplation and ob-
 servation of Nature, "No man
 " dyed ever of any Disease
 " but the last he was sick of.
 " No man ever drank a whole
 " Glass of Wine but the last
 " when he drank it. If the
 word [last] carries no force in
 it, either to make the Disease
 more malignant, or the Wine
 more pleasant; such Specula-
 tions, though they have a
 truth in them, will go for no
 better than ridiculous: so [last]
 which adds nothing to the
 Will, might have been left out
 in the Definition. And yet I

am content it should stand there still, untill you see more cause to remove it, as perhaps you may when we come to the third point; for there we are promised to hear more of the same matter, a point set apart of purpose to shew the nature of the Will and Inclinations.

Second Point is the Definition of Deliberation. *Deliberation is nothing but Alternate Hope and Fear, or Alternate Appetite to do or quit the Action.*

It's a strange impropriety of Speech, i. to say that Deliberation, which is an act of the Understanding, should be either Fear or Hope, which be affections; such a confus'd tumbling together of the Faculties

culties of the Soul becomes onely him, that either understands not, or desires not to be understood. But perhaps his meaning may be, that the Understanding in Deliberation represents one-while matter of Fear, otherwhile of Hope. This, I confess, is true, and that this Hope or Fear doth not always produce such a resolution and act of the Will, upon which the Action follows; but yet produces a true and perfect resolution, or act of the Will. For it is not possible for a man to have true cause and matter of Hope represented to him; but he must will it, at least in a degree, and so long as that Hope is not impeach'd

peach'd by a new Deliberation. So it is alike in Fear, that whosoever actually fears any evil, effectually wills the avoiding of it, till something intervenes that diverts the Fear. But of this more in the next Point.

Third Point. The Will is defined to be the *last Appetite, and is immediately before the doing of the Action.* Other Appetites that come upon men in time of Deliberation are but intentions and inclinations. The truth of these and the like Points (saith Mr. *Hobbs*) is to be tried by reflection upon our selves, what we conceive when such Speeches are us'd: and then the Will is nothing else

else but the last Appetite. Methinks Mr. *Hobbs* should have heard of *Voluntas ambulatoria*, a Will liable to change; and therefore every Will is not the last. For if you reflect, you shall find a man seriously to will and resolve that to day, which the next day he wills not. When a man makes his Testament, which is also call'd his last Will, and is indeed of all others the most resolv'd act of his Will; yet he may change that Will, and often men do it. But then you say it ceaseth to be his last Will. 'Tis true. And therefore something was a Will for the time, which was not the last Appetite. But it cannot now be call'd his Will. True,
be-

because he has chang'd it, not because it is not last ; for herein (say we) consists the liberty of a voluntary Agent, that he can change his Will, and make that not to be last which once was last, that is, he hath power over his last Will, I mean over that which for the time was the last, and was as serious and resolv'd as the last.

And for those Actions which he calls only Intentions and Inclinations, I see no reason why they should not be called Wills; seeing 1. they are acts of the Will, for no application of the Soul to any thing, upon a reason can proceed from the inferiour Sensitive part, and therefore must either be acts
of

of the Will, or be nothing at all. And 2ly. by Mr. *Hobbe's* own rule and definition of Will, every one of those successive Appetites are Wills, because 'till another consequent Appetite followed, they were the last for the time, and therefore in their courses and turns all are Wills. Indeed after they are changed and unwilled again, I think no man desires they should be still called Wills, when they cease to be at all.

Fourth Point. *To say he is a free Agent, is all one to say, He hath made an end of Deliberation.*

Here I shall call Mr. *Hobbs* again to his own reflection, whe-

whether a man cannot be said to be free, before he hath made an end of Deliberation, rather than after? As when I desire to have a friend dine with me, I meaning to ask him first whether he be ingaged, or resolv'd for any other company, do use these words; *Sir, are you free?* and if he answers me that he is free, I presently apprehend, that he is not resolv'd for any particular, but is still capable of a resolution to dine with me. Not, but that he may be said to be free too that hath made an end of Deliberation, but in another sense; that is, he is free from all doubts that come by Deliberation. But the same may be

be free also before Deliberation is ended, but it is from particular determinations and resolutions, which is the freedom we defend, to do or not to do. And this seems to be a greater and more proper Freedom than the other; for he that is free from Deliberation, acts indeed freely, but it is in that one way to which he is resolved. But he that is so free as to go any way, is more free than he that goes but freely in one way.

Fifth Point. *Liberty is the absence of all Impediments to Action, that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical qualities of the Agent.*

If it will content Mr. Hobbs,
That

That shall be allow'd to be one sence of the word: but if I may have leave to do but what he desires I should do, reflect, I find another sence, and the very same which is denied by him, A Liberty from Necessity. As when a Father recommends a Wife to his Son, the Son hath, no doubt, liberty to take that Wife in Mr. *Hobbs* his sence. And yet if the same Son should desire his Father to give him his liberty, the Father would presently apprehend, that he desired somewhat that he had not given him, that is, leave as well to refuse her if he saw cause, as to take her; he would not cavil with him, and say, You have the liberty

berty in that you are ty'd to her: but if he means to give him his liberty, his meaning also will be to absolve him of the necessity to take her. By this we see, that no advantage is gotten to Mr. *Hobbs* by reflection, which shews a Liberty from Necessity reflected also.

Sixth Point is an argument to prove, That *all Actions are necessitated, because they have necessary Causes.*

I deny the Consequence. For when he sayes, That all Actions have their necessary Causes, his meaning is (if his meaning agree with the reason he gives of it,) That it is necessary they have Causes, *because*

cause (saith he) *nothing can have*
beginning from it self. Now
 can any one imagine, that a re-
 flecting man should think this a
 good consequence? Nothing
 can have beginning from it
 self, and therefore every thing
 is necessitated: that because
 an Effect must necessarily be
 produced by some Cause, that
 therefore the Cause did neces-
 sarily produce that Effect. For,
 good Sir, reflect again; and
 bethink your self, That as some
 Effects cannot be produced
 but by a concurrence of many
 Causes together, every one
 of these is necessary to the
 producing of the Effect, and
 yet not any one of these doth
 necessitate the Effect; but ra-
 ther

ther it is necessary that nothing should be effected, if that cause be single and alone.

Seventh Point is another argument to prove, That *voluntary actions are necessitated, because they have sufficient Causes, and all sufficient Causes are necessary.*

That all sufficient Causes are necessary, [sufficient] may have a double meaning: either when there is sufficient virtue and aptness in the things to produce the Effect, if they were us'd and imployed by the Agent; or else when the Agent also actually imployes them to that purpose till the work be produc'd.

Take.

Take [sufficient] in this latter sense, and all men will confess, that the Effect will follow necessarily. But the Power, which the Will is said to have over sufficient Causes, is understood of such onely as are sufficient in the first sense, (*i.e.*) such as have aptness in them to produce the Effect, when they are used; which is a sense both common and reasonable: As I have sufficient to pay all my Debts, I have sufficient to defray the charges of a years travel; and yet neither pay a Penny, nor stir a foot.

Eighth Point charges the Definition of a Free Agent that is given by others, with *Nonsense and Contradiction*; *viz.*

viz. That when all things needful to produce the Effect be present, can nevertheless not produce it.

For the Nonsense let it lie between us a while, 'till the matter be examined a little, and then let them take it that have most right to it. If there be any Nonsense in the Definition, it must be either in the meaning of them that use it, or in the words they use to express their meaning. When they speak of all things needful to produce the Effect, their meaning is well known to be of all except the Agent's Will: or if it were not known to Mr. Hobbs, it might and ought to have been from the
very

very words of the Definition, which plainly suppose the Will of the Agent to be yet undetermined. All things needful in this sense may well be, and yet nothing produc'd, because the Agent hath not yet resolv'd to use them. But if Mr. *Hobbs* will make them mean what they do not, he may very well make them speak what they should not. Now if their meaning imply no Contradiction or Nonsense, as certainly it doth not, then of necessity the words must, or it will not be difficult on whom to bestow the Nonsense. And for the words, (to say there be all things needful, when yet the Agent is excepted, who
is

is no less needful than any of the rest,) let the common language of men, or as Mr. *Hobbs* is pleased to call it, let Reflexion be judge. As when a man hath a good seat for a House, all materials, workmen, and mony to defray the charges, he may, and commonly doth use to say, He hath all things requisite and needful to build a House, and then too when his Will is yet suspended, and unresolved whether to use them or not. Therefore your Self, or, if you will, Reflexion being judge, you have clapt the Nonsense upon your own head.

But enough of the Points,
let us see if we can mend

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our

our selves with the Reasons of them.

REASONS.

Wipe your Eyes, I beseech you, for never were there such Reasons seen before, such Mysteries discovered.

For the first Point, yea for five of the eight Points, the Reasons are; That they have no Reasons. For he sayes they cannot be prov'd but by Reflexion: and in that he speaks but truth; for 'tis sure, no reason or proof can be made of the signification and use of Words, which is all that the first five Points have blest us with. But though he said true, in saying no Reasons could

could be given; yet he said not well in promising Reasons, when he puts us off with Reflexions. Of the five first points himself confesses that no Reasons can be given; and of the two next, if he will not confess so too, he shall be compelled. For they are Arguments, and contain in effect and substance Syllogisms, which are incapable of Reasons; for who ever went about to give, or could give Reason of a whole Syllogism, if the Reasons presented belong to any part of the Syllogism, in which case only Reasons can be given? Let him but say to which part of his Points his Reason belongs, and I will do him so much reason

as to acknowledge it. In the mean time he stands upon his good Behaviour, whether these two points shall be allowed to have any more reason than the five former. And for the eighth and last point, which is all the hope that is left us to be a point of reason, his Reason is, That as he said before, so now he sayes again; and whatsoever Mr. *Hobbs* is pleased to say twice over, you may be assur'd is true.

This is the summe of his Reasons, in the most sober and favourable construction I can make of them; yet because under the title of the seventh Reason, some new matter is alledg'd, that was not spoken
of

of before, I shall say something to that too.

He layes down a Proposition more general than the question, *That all Events never so casual have necessary Causes.*

If I should grant this, yet the voluntary Agent may be free, though the work which he produces be necessary. This I shall shew in the Instances which are brought to prove this Proposition.

The first is of the Chance of a Die. I confess, that though it be very casual to the Caster, yet it doth necessarily come to pass upon such postures and motions of the Hand and Die, as happen'd to meet together

at that time: yet I say too, that as to the Caster of the Die it was not necessary, because he had a double power over that Chance to have hinder'd it if he pleas'd; for either he might not have thrown the Dice at all, or he might have so ordered the motion and posture of his hand that could have caused another Chance. Yea more (desiring to avoid controversies, as much as Mr. *Hobbs* doth to make them) I grant also, that there is a time when, and a respect wherein voluntary Agents are in the same condition with natural, and do act necessarily. For not only a natural Agent solely and singly doth work his proper na-

natural Effect necessarily, as the Fire necessarily heats; but also when they are in conjunction together, as it were a corporation of Causes: whether that be casual, as the motions and posture of the hand, meeting with suitable postures with the Die and the Table, do produce necessarily a certain chance; or whether it be artificial, as the Medicine compounded of several Drugs do necessarily produce a common Effect, beyond the vertue of their particular natures apart, which belongs to them onely in that conjunction and society of operation. So likewise a voluntary Agent, constantly resolv'd, and actually cooperating

rating with other sufficient causes, doth as necessarily produce the Effect, as any natural Agent, working either alone, or in conjunction and society; So as in this case, if Mr. *Hobbs* seeks for an Adversary, I assure myself he will find none; and if he thinks he hath found a Truth, 'tis but such as was never lost. But when we affirm voluntary Agents to be free from necessity in acting, we look upon them in another state and condition; for they act not like natural Agents, whose work immediately follows and flows from their Being, but have a progressive operation, that is before any thing: beside their Being, they de-

deliberate, resolve, and fall to execution, and there is a time for all these allow'd. And though when they are come to that perfect state and progress, that they have pass'd the irrevocable resolv'd Will, they act as necessarily as natural Agents do: yet in their imperfect state, that is, from their first Deliberation to their last constant Resolution, they are absolutely free to do, or not to do. In which case alone we assert the liberty of voluntary Agents, against which nothing either is or can be prov'd by the instance of the chance of a Die.

2. And for the other instance of the Weather, That

whatsoever comes to pass, *rain*,
or *not rain*, it comes so to pass
necessarily.

I answer, first, that this is
impertinent to the question;
concerning the liberty of vo-
luntary Agents, who have no
operation or concurrence to
the event of Weather.

And secondly, the reason
that is us'd to prove that neces-
sary, is insufficient in many
respects: as because it is neces-
sary that one of the two must
happen, either *rain* or *no rain*,
therefore that which doth hap-
pen, comes to pass necessarily.
My first reason is, because the
truth of a Disjunctive Propo-
sition, as this is, [it must *rain*,
or *not rain*,] consists in *disjun-*
ctiōe

trione partium, and not in *dis-junctis partibus* ; for when you resolve this Proposition into two Categoricks, [it shall rain] for one, and [it shall not rain] for another, which resolution the event will make, as the nature, so the truth of the Proposition is changed. For when the Event hath turned the Disjunctive Proposition into a Categorick, as that [it rains,] it cannot partake of that Necessity, which consisted onely in the Disjunctive. And to make this plain, I shall quit your Instance with another. Suppose I am confin'd to live within the walls of London, so as it is now necessary for me either to live in Cheap-side, or in

in some other part of the City;
yet am I not ty'd, by that confinement to *London*, to any one place: if I were ty'd and necessitated to any one place, it must be either to that place I chuse to live in, or to that I do not live in. The latter I hope no man will imagine can be necessary, to live where I do not; and if the former were necessary, that is, to live where I do, viz. (for Example) in *Cheap-side*, then by vertue of that confinement to *London*, I might be punish'd if I had not liv'd in *Cheap-side*; in which case a Jury out of *Bethlem* would not condemn me, for that were to make it all one to be necessitated to live in *London*,

don, and to be necessitated to live in *Cheap-side*. And the reason why from the necessity of the Disjunction cannot be inferr'd a necessity to the parts of it separately, is clear by the Instance I have given. The necessity that is laid upon me is to the whole latitude and compass of *London*, which leaves me free to any part within that latitude. So the necessity that it shall *rain or not rain*, is onely to the compass and latitude that these two make, *raining or not raining*; but within that latitude as to the one alone, or to the other, there is no necessity. If you say it is necessary for me to live in *Cheap-side*, because I live in no other

other part of the City; so that it is necessary it should rain, because it doth not hold up: I answer, that this is a necessity of Consequence, which infers no necessity upon the Consequent, which is the Necessity in question; that is, that my living in *Cheap-side*, or the raining to morrow, which are the Consequents, did come to pass by necessary Causes. And because I am afraid of Mr. *Hobbs* his bitter *Sarcasm* upon Distinctions, that to say, It is necessary *necessitate consequentie*, but not *consequentis*, is all one to say, It is necessary *Tityre*, but not necessary *in patria*; I will prevent it, by shewing the difference in an instance. If

Mr.

Mr. *Hobbs* would not have the Goose go bare-foot, it is necessary he should shoo it; this no doubt but is a necessary consequence, and yet I suppose he will not think that the consequent is necessary: as that it is necessary he should shoo the Goose; and, to say truth, there is no more necessity it should rain to-morrow, than there is to shoo a Goose.

3. In this instance of the Weather there is another impertinency about Necessity: for whereas the question is, Whether all things come to pass necessarily? that is, out of such necessary Causes, that it was not possible they should not come to pass; the proof of this
is

is taken from such a necessity as belongs onely to Propositions, not to Productions. Which necessity of Propositions consists onely in a necessary coherence of the parts together, so as the Enunciation is never false: as when the *Genus* is predicated of the *Species*, or the proper Accident of the Subject; as, *Homo est Animal*, & *Homo est visibilis*, are Propositions necessarily true, because they are alwayes true, and nothing can happen that should make them false. So it is necessary, that it should rain or not rain to morrow, that is, it is a Proposition necessarily true, and cannot but be true; but no intimation of the Necessity in que-

question, which is the necessary production of these Events from necessary Causes. For if this Necessity were implied in that Disjunction, then every necessary Proposition should consist of a necessary Effect, predicated of sufficient and necessary Causes, which every mean Logician knows to be false. And therefore, to use *Mr. Hobbs* his own words, because he is like to be best pleased with them, this is all one as to say, It is necessary *Tityricè*, *Ergo* it is necessary *tupatolicè*. After he hath given his Proofs, as he thinks, in full weight, like a free Chapman, he casts in one Argument over and above, taken from *God's*
De.

Decrees and Prescience.

Because Mr. *Hobbs* himself doth not warrant this to be good Logick, I cannot in civility charge him for it; but if his design be in that caution [if I thought it good Logick] to make us believe, that he made a conscience of keeping these Rules, I am sorry for his ill luck that he chose to do it here: for if he had but dipped his finger blindfold upon any other part of his Discourse, he might with more colour have accused himself than in this. For I pray, against what Rule of Logick doth he trespass, that useth what arguments he pleaseth? But so apt is he to mistake in reprehending others, that he cannot

cannot blame himself without an error: yet for all this, though there be no want of Logick in using this argument, yet there is not much in the argument he uses.

First in general, both for the Decree and Prescience together, they be Divine Actions that proceed from God's Attributes; and the using of such for arguments of truth in other things, Mr. *Hobbs* himself in his Postscript confesseth to be the cause of those many Errors that men fall into: yet had he not the grace to forbear, but falls himself into the same condemnation he decreed to others, as if he would prove his Error by his Fault. For what
but

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but a Fatal Necessity could make him to do that which with the same breath almost he condemns? But to particulars.

First, of the Decree, that it is frustrated by Liberty.

1. I answer, that to prove Necessity from God's Decrees, is to prove *obscurum per obscurius*: for of all the points of Divinity, it is confessed by all that write of it, That nothing is more obscure than the nature and efficacy of Divine Decrees. That is one *Elenche* and Fallacy in Logick.

2. Another is, That [Decree] is an equivocal word, and admits of diverse senses and constructions. As, for instance,
God

God decrees to destroy some City: that it may be either Conditional, as if it repent not; or Absolute, whether it repent or no. 2. That Absolute may be either as to the destruction of the City onely, and not to the means by which it is to be destroyed, or to both. For though God should decree absolutely to destroy the City, yet it is yet free that it be done either by the mutual dissensions of the Citizens, or the invasion of an Enemy; either of which are a sufficient, neither a necessary meanes: Dissension is not necessary, because it may be by Invasion; and Invasion is not, because it may be by Dissension. 3. It may be
Ab-

Absolute both to the thing and to the means. As for the purpose, that it may be by Dissension among the Citizens; yet that means may come to effect it two wayes; either upon foresight, that they would dissent of themselves, or by another Decree of God that they should dissent. 4. God may also decree that two wayes, either by working upon the Will by a power irresistible, *per motionem Physicam*, as they call it; or *per Moralem*, that is, such inducements and inclinations as will *ducere*, not *trahere*; by either of which wayes God's Decree may be accomplished. This variety, partly in the Decrees, partly in the constructions

ons

ons that are made of them, which do all imply a different respect to Liberty, doth make the Argument from general words insufficient to conclude any thing, for *dolus semper versatur in generalibus & equivocis*. That's another Fallacy in Logick.

3. Seeing Mr. *Hobbs* hides himself from his Adversary, in this Thicket of acceptions, it will be necessary to beat every Bush for him, and by inductions of the several sorts of Decrees, to shew that Liberty threatens no destruction to any of them, or, to speak more aptly, needs fear none from them. For if they be inconsistent and mutually destructive, it is rather

ther to be said, that the Decree of God should destroy the Liberty of man, than that the Liberty of man should destroy the Decree of God.

And that God's Decree hath no such operations upon man's Liberty, I shall instance in the most eminent of all his Decrees, in which all the world and their actions are concerned; I mean that of Election and Reprobation, briefly carrying you through the several opinions and perswasions that several men have of them.

I. That Decree, by which men are said to be ordain'd to Salvation as Believers, and to Damnation as dying in impenitence, presupposing their Faith

Faith and Impenitence , can have no operation upon those actions that went before , before (I mean) in consideration, though not in time.

2. That Decree which is put in such an order, as makes it antecedent to mens actions, may preserve the liberty of their Wills divers wayes, and by name, *per congruam vocationem*, that is, by fitting them with such opportune and seasonable inducements, as will infallibly determine but not necessitate them.

3. That Decree that lies in a middle way, between the two forenamed, that in Election goes before, in Reprobation follows the actions; ac-

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cor-

ding to which opinion, for distinction, the Reprobate are called *Præsciti*, because they be looked upon as Sinners before they be reprobated; and the Elect are more peculiarly called *Prædestinati*, because they are elected before, or without consideration of being Believers. This Decree, as to the Reprobates, can have no operation upon their actions, because it follows them. And as to the Elect, though it goes before their faith, yet, as was said before, it leaves it free to follow after.

If Mr. *Hobbs* his Decree be any of these, or some others, (for others there be) let him wink and choose, or let him take

take the most rigid or peremptory of all, that of the *Calvinists*, that damns men before it makes them, and saves them before they have any thing to be saved; which Decree above all others is most like to impose a Necessity upon humane actions; yet here the argument will fail too.

1. Because there be a great many voluntary actions that come not under this Decree, as having no reference to life or death, from the Decrees whereof must that Necessity flow. As for Example, All indifferent actions, which have nothing of Morality, of Virtue, or Vice in them, which we shall never carry to Heaven or Hell with

us. Now those Actions which work nothing towards the accomplishing of the Decree, can receive no Necessity from it: for if there be any Necessity from the Decree, upon humane Actions, it is because it cannot be accomplished without them.

2. Upon the same account, not onely indifferent but many moral Actions are free from the necessity of the Decree. For Example, all the good that a Reprobate doth (for no doubt they do many things morally and substantially good, and abstain from many Evils,) cannot be necessitated by the Decree of Reprobation; for certainly a man may be damned without doing good. In like

like manner all the evil that the Elect doth (for who is there that sins not?) is also free from the Necessity his Decree can lay upon him, unless you will say it is necessary for him to sin, that he may be saved; for he is under no other Decree, but that unto life and salvation.

3. Upon the same score I adde further, that the Decree layes no Necessity upon any one action a man doth; for not onely Election cannot necessitate a man to sin, and Reprobation cannot necessitate a man to do good; but also neither doth Election necessitate a man to do good, nor Reprobation evil, as to any particular good

or evil: the reason is, because their Decrees may be brought to pass without them. As *Judas*, though he had not betray'd his Master, might have been hanged for some other sin; for certainly Reprobation doth not necessitate a man to kill his Father or Mother, or to commit any other sin by name. So likewise *St. Peter* might have been saved, though he had not at that time when he did, made his confession, that *Christ was the Son of God*, because it had been sufficient to accomplish the Decree of Election to have believed in Christ at any other time: and if no individual action be necessary to the bringing of that
to

to pass which God hath decreed, then whatsoever else may, the Decree cannot make it necessary. Now if the Decree gives no necessity to actions indifferent, nor to good actions on the Reprobate, nor to evil in the Elect, no, nor to any one particular to either of them; what actions are there left, upon which the Decree can have any such operation? Lastly, if the Decree may pass upon men without respect to their well or ill doing, as in the last nam'd Opinion (which of all others is confess'd most likely to necessitate) is supposed, then 'tis evident there can be no Necessity to do well or ill in reference to the Decree,

D. 4. which

which hath no reference to well or ill doing. But you will say, to do this or that is necessary, though not to the Decree it self, yet to the execution of it. And I beseech you why so? for may not a man as justly be hang'd without merit, as be condemn'd to be hang'd without it? Howsoever it is ill done to lay that upon the Decree, which belongs to the execution of it, and 'tis worse if it belongs to neither. But it may be Mr. *Hobbs* has another kind of Decree by himself, as he hath many other concepts. If he hath, it may prove to be of that nature, when he shall vouchsafe to let us know it, that I shall deny the
the

the antecedent of his argument, That there is any such Decree; but be it what it will, I shall the consequence, That therefore there is no liberty in humane actions: which I wonder he should let go upon his bare word, when he cannot but know, that thousands of Authors, which do not agree about the nature of the Decrees, do yet all agree in denying the consequence.

Secondly, of Prescience, and argument taken from it,

I. Though it be an improper speech to say, that God foresees any thing, which must imply a *prius* and *posterius* in his actions, things incompatible with Eternity, that is pre-

sent to all times; yet because we cannot understand God's actions but by taking measure by our own, and future things are not seen by us but foreseen, I do allow Mr. *Hobbs* to say, That those things which are future to us, though not to God, are yet foreseen by him, provided, that use be not made of it, to argue from his foresight as an act that is past, upon which as a Cause must depend an Effect that must follow after it: for God's vision doth not prevent the thing

seen but accompany it: for

that's the nature of every act, that it supposes the object in some kind of being, and so is meerly accidental to the nature

ture of it, and can lay no necessity upon it. And though it be hard to comprehend, how God should now be said to be present with those things which are yet to come; and yet on the other side it is as hard to apprehend how it can be otherwise, that God should be eternal, and yet not present with any part of time, as well future as past. When Mr. *Hobbes* shall teach us, how God can see that which is not to be seen, for that which is future is not, and therefore is not to be seen; and to say they are to be seen

in their Causes, is liable to the same difficulties, because the particular Causes of the thing are as well future as the thing
 it

it self: that is, if he can shew a better way than this, That those things are present to God which are future to us, I will let go my hold. In the mean time it shall serve for my first answer to the argument from God's Prescience, That because all vision supposes the thing seen to be, it is accidental to it, and cannot necessitate it.

2. Admitting foresight in God as an act past, and the thing to follow, it must follow in the same condition it was foreseen, (granting me that which I shall presently prove; That God can foresee contingent things.) That which in the nature of it was contingent,

gent, cannot become necessary by being foreseen; for then he should notice as they are. But you will say, If God foresees them, it is necessary they should come to pass; I say so too, but how? in that quality that God foresaw them, that is, contingently; for it's as necessary, that those things that are produced of contingent Causes, should come to pass, as those that are produced of necessary, upon supposition of God's foresight: and it is no bull in that sense to say, That contingent things are necessary. For there is a double Necessity, one of Illation and Discourse, an other of Production and Operation. To affirm

affirm the latter of contingent things implies a contradiction, but not so the former; that is, God's Prescience is a necessary argument to prove, because he cannot be mistaken, but not a necessary Cause to produce the Effect, of which only necessity the question is moved. This argument therefore hath a term too many; there is one Necessity in the Premises, another in the Conclusion, *Præscientia Dei necessario probat, non necessario producit.*

3. If Mr. H. shall deny that which I promised to prove, That God can foresee contingent Events; because they have no necessary Causes; then he
can-

cannot also foresee what shall come to pass or not come to pass, upon the performance or not performance of a condition. But that God can foresee such things, I hope he will not deny; yet because he is a liberal and fierce denyer, I shall put in him mind of one Instance. God told *David* that the men of *Keilah* would deliver him into *Saul's* hand, but with this tacite condition, If he stay'd among them. And for the consequence, I prove it thus: In this prediction and prevision of what the men of *Keilah* would do, there was no necessary Cause, as is plain, for that it did not bring to pass the Effect; for the men of
Keilah

Keilah did not, though God foresaw it, deliver *David* into *Saul's* hand.

And if God can foresee what would have been, but what was not, why may he not rather foresee any thing that shall be, though it may not have been, that is, any future contingent? For if the reason why future contingents cannot be seen or foreseen, be, that they have no necessary Causes; then conditional previsions and predictions of such things, as for failure of the condition come not to pass, could not be foreseen also, for that they have no necessary Causes, as appears by the event.

These be all Mr. *Hobbs* his
Ar-

Arguments ; yet because he hath found another invention, a kind of Lieutenant-Argument, to which we are ever and anon remitted when arguments be out of the way, which he calls *Reflection*, and he may take it ill if it goes away unlooked on, it will be necessary to exchange a word or two about it also.

OF

IN

OF
REFLECTION.

LET us see how well it deserves to stand in the Muster-roll of his *Militia*, and hath done such Facts for the subduing of those Monstrous Errors of our Ignorant Forefathers, as is pretended, and for which he dresses a particular Discourse. This you will easily perceive both by the Nature of it, and the Effects and Atchievements of it.

I. The Nature of it is (as far as I can guess) to consider what I my self think of that
which

which another says and proves not: that is, I demand of him and would know, whether that be true which he affirms, he bids me, Go look. Now is that a way to teach me Knowledge, to send me to my self, that is, to one that is ignorant, to inform me? And this is that *Columbus* of our New World of Philosophy, *Reflection*. This is that which (by a Digression on purpose) is celebrated to Posterity as an excellent new Engine, that will fetch Truth out of the very bottom of *Democritus* his Pit. And yet perhaps there's more in it, than we are at the first sight able to apprehend, especially being blinded with our
our

our Old and Hereditary Errors.

2. Therefore he shewsto the World two Noble Experiments of the vertue of it, which he hath found in himself; two such Rarities, as could never be found in all the Books and Philosophers that ever you met with. One is, that thinking a thing to be good, and loving it, is all one. The other, that Eternity is not *Nunc stans*. These be the two rare Experiments which (like a prudent Mountebank) he hangs out for the better reputation and vending his *Reflection*.

I must needs grant, that these be two admirable strange
Ef-

Effects of it. For in the first, Reflection makes him see that which is not; and in the second, it makes him not see that which is.

For First, that thinking a thing to be good, and loving it, is all one; who ever saw such a sight before times? who can believe that any thing should make Thinking and Loving all one? For my part I am still in as much doubt as ever I was; for no Reflection can prevail with me before these Reasons.

I. Because they proceed from several Faculties of the Soul; one from the Intellectual, the other from the Effective part. It is not in the power of
Re-

Reflection to persuade me
that the same Water comes
out of two distinct Foun-
tains.

2. Because nothing can go
before it self; and he that
loves any thing because he hath
reason to think it good, must
of necessity first think it to be
so.

3. If Thinking and Loving
were all one, then to think a
thing to be evil, and to love it,
is all one too. For if the Acts
themselves be not all one, the
Object that is the Good can-
not make them so. But he
will say, If a man reflects, *i. e.*
if he mark it, he that doth the
one, doth the other too: and
they go always together, and
then

then why not all one?

I. I will tell you why, and I find it by Reflection too; that he that speaks doth always open his Mouth; and yet they are not all one. The Needle also and the Thred go together, and yet not all one. They that first told us of *Hippocentaurres*, certain Creatures that are half Men and half Beasts, I believe found them out by Reflection too. For the *Barbarians*, when they first saw Men upon the backs of Beasts so near together, thought them to be but one Creature. Just so, to make Loving and Thinking all one, because he sees them together, is one of *Mr. Hobbs's Hippocentaurres*; for he

he hath a Herd of them in this little Copse: As that Spontaneous and Voluntary are all one, that Deliberation and Alternate Hope and Fear are all one, that to make an end of Deliberation and to be Free is all one, that Sufficient and Necessary is all one, that to be necessarily of some Cause and to be necessitated is all one. In all these to believe them, or not to believe them, I hope will be all one too.

2. As they are not the same, though they go together; so they cannot be the same, because they go not together. I mean necessarily. For first there may be thinking of a thing good without loving it, a thing
too

too too well known, that men
act contrary to their know-
ledge ;

———*Video meliora, probòque ;
Deteriora sequor*———

Secondly, there may be a lo-
ving of that which they do not
think and judge to be good,
because Love many times em-
braces the good that Sensuali-
ty offers; which is contrary
to that good which serious
thinking commends. And I
make a question, whether e-
very thing that loves, can
think also and judge. For I
know that an Als loves Pro-
vender; yet I would give
somewhat to know what he
E thinks

thinks for all that; which I would not if they were all one. But it may be I may wrong the poor As also to say he cannot think; for there be some Philosophers so charitable to Beasts, as to say they can reason and discourse. Well, if I have wrong'd the As I will make him amends, and say, that if he can think, he can reflect too; and if he can do that, he may be one of our new Philosophers, that shall find out many Truths that *Aristotle* never knew; and particularly, shall see plainly that which never a Philosopher of them all did see: that to think a thing to be good, and to love it, is all one. For that is the first

first benefit of Reflection, to see that which is not.

2. The next is, not to see that which is, as that *Nunc stans* is nothing, or signifies nothing, of Eternity.

If Mr. *Hobbs* his meaning be, that those words do not clearly and fully express what Eternity is, it is so vulgar a Truth, as well for all things that be Infinite, as this, and for all words that can be invented by Man, as well as these, that he needed not the help of this rare Invention to discover it. But if his meaning be, that by those Terms (*Nunc stans*) an imperfect knowledge of Eternity (such as Infinite things are capable of)

of) cannot be known, namely, that which consists in denying and removing such Qualities and Affections from it, as belong to finite things; he is very little beholden to his Reflection if it will not let him see so much; which is all that any man can desire or hope to see of Infinite things.

And that so much may be seen of Eternity by *Nunc stans*, I shall desire him to forbear reflecting upon himself, that is, upon one that deceives him, and reflect upon the meaning of the Terms that use them, when Eternity is said to be [*Nunc*,] it is to remove from it *præteritum & futurum, prius & posterius*, which are parts of Time,

Time, that is finite ; therefore they say that all times are present with the Eternal at once. And it is likewise called *Nunc stans*, to remove from it a Succession or Motion of part after part, which belongs onely to Time, that is finite ; for that to which any thing is added must needs be finite ; though you adde a thousand thousand, and and after that ten thousand times as many more without stint, you can never make it *Infinitum* or *Æternum*. And therefore to remove from Eternity these finite Conceptions, the Terms of *Nunc stans* are not unfitly us'd for that purpose: and for more knowledge of Eternity than that, it

was never in any mans purpose to use them. If your Reflection would not let you see this, I am afraid that though it make you quick at seeing some things, that no body else can see; yet in that other-while it takes away from you the sight of that which every body sees; I am afraid (I say) it is not good for the eyesight. I conclude therefore, (without thinking of any other revenge for the Nonsense, and Contradiction, and the *Tityres* and *Tu patules*, and such gear as Mr. *Hobbs* is pleased to daub all those with that are not of his mind) with this good counsel, that he give over his Reflection in time, lest instead

stead of teaching him some new tricks in Philosophy, it make him at last play at *Old blind, &c.*

I should here make an end, but that I see Paper enough left, and leisure too to answer an Objection that I may seemlyable to: as, What do I sneak-
ing into a Private Letter, which Mr. *Hobbs* wrote to his Obliging Lord? Who besides is said, not to write Philosophy for those that like it not; and therefore I ought not to trouble him that desires not to trouble me.

To the first I answer, That though the Letter was once a

Private one, yet I saw it not till it became a Publick, till they were Letters Patents for any bodies reading. And for the other, though it be reason not to trouble them that do not trouble us in some cases, as if Mr. *Hobbs* had vented his new Speculations upon making Faces and Distortions, turning and tossing the poor Figures up and down, and then guessing at some Reasons of them, which he merrily calls his Opticks; I say, if Mr. *Hobbs* had spent his Time and Philosophy upon these onely, he had onely disturbed the Commonwealth of Images and Representations, which are nothing, and therefore ought not to have

have been disturbed by any in those his pleasant Speculations. But when (against mine and every bodies Interest) he labours to introduce a Necessity into all mens Actions, that they have no power to do more or less than they do, he takes away the nature of Vertues and Vices, and so their relation to Reward and Punishment; and by consequence leaves no place for Hope or Fear: which must needs shake not onely the Foundation of all Religion, but even of Human Society. It is such a pernicious piece of Philosophy, as a Wise man would not, and a Fool should not be suffered to vent; fitter in-

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deed for a Beadle's, than a
Scholar's, Whip ; and to him
I leave him.

I, Liſtor, colliga manus.

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FINIS.

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